The Office of Attorney General William Tong
Formal Opinions
Page 30 of 41
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Honorable George Jepsen, State Capitol, 2002-011 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have requested our opinion regarding the responsibility for providing police services at the University of Connecticut Stadium at Rentschler Field in East Hartford and at the Adriaen’s Landing Project in Hartford.
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You have asked for an opinion interpreting Conn. Gen. Stats. § 17a-101a, the mandated reporter statute. Section 17a-101a requires certain individuals enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stats. § 17a-101(b)1 to notify the Department of Children and Families (the Department or DCF) or a law enforcement agency when they have "reasonable cause to suspect or believe" that child abuse or neglect, as defined in Conn. Gen. Stats. § 46a-120, has occurred. Your question concerns the obligations of a mandated reporter who becomes aware that a minor under the age of sixteen is engaged in a sexual relationship.
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You ask us whether the Division of Special Revenue (DOSR) may approve a contract between Autotote Enterprises, Inc., the licensee of the Connecticut Off-Track Betting System, and Wyvern International, Ltd., which would provide for simulcasting and common pool wagering on thoroughbred races in Australia pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-571(a).
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The Honorable James Amann, State Capitol, 2003-002 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to the proper construction of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-44a, which governs the appointment of the Judicial Selection Commission, given an internal inconsistency in the statute created by the recent reapportionment of Connecticut's congressional districts.
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This is in response to your request for opinion pertaining to reimbursement of regulatory costs under the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 24996 (May 31, 1991) (Procedures). You ask whether the Procedures, which allow you to assess the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe (Tribe) for "reasonable and necessary costs" of regulating and investigating operations at Foxwoods, include reimbursement of indirect as well as direct costs.
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You have asked for my opinion with regard to a question raised by the state auditors on the propriety of an expenditure made by the Criminal Justice Commission. It is my understanding that your request was prompted by a recommendation made by the auditors, who concluded that it appeared that the Division's June 1996 reimbursement of legal fees to a State's Attorney in connection with his reappointment to that position in 1988 may have circumvented the intentions of the General Assembly with respect to the total monies approved for payment to the State's Attorney by the Claims Commissioner.
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By letter dated December 2, 1992, you have requested an opinion as to whether the State Employees' Retirement Commission [hereinafter Commission or SERC] has the authority to place Nicholas A. Cioffi, who joined the State Employees' Retirement System [hereinafter SERS or the Retirement System] after July 1, 1984, in Tier I of that system, with no Social Security coverage.
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This is in response to your recent request for an opinion on whether there exists legislative authority for the Division of Special Revenue to institute a "cash" lotto in addition to the other lottery games currently conducted by, or under the authority of, the Division.
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In your letter of November 25, 1991, you request our guidance concerning the issue of personal liability of state officials in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991). To better respond to the issues posed in your letter, we have framed your inquiry as follows: 1. How does the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hafer v. Melo affect a state official's exposure to personal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts performed as part of his official duties? 2. Under what circumstances will the state provide for the defense as well as indemnification of a state official when sued personally pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts taken in the course of the performance of his official duties?
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You have requested a formal opinion of the Attorney General as to "whether a former Deputy Sheriff, former High Sheriff or a State Marshal who resigns from his appointment may continue to collect wage executions they had served while acting in their official capacities."
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As Chairman of the State Marshal Commission you have requested a formal Opinion of the Attorney General as to the following four questions: 1. While the State Marshal Commission has duly appointed all state marshals, none has been “sworn.” Must state marshals be "sworn"? If so, what oath is to be administered and who may administer it? 2. Does a state marshal have "police" or law enforcement powers? If so, what is the scope of such powers? 3. State marshals are referred to in the General Statutes as "peace officers." What powers are conferred upon "peace officers"? Are these the only "police" or law enforcement powers that state marshals possess? 4. Do you have any suggested modifications to the above certificate language?
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You have requested our advice regarding your obligations under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-61dd, known as the "whistleblower" statute. You have explained that, in the course of reviewing a whistleblower complaint, you have obtained access to client records from the Office of Protection and Advocacy.
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Deputy Commissioner Gilligan requested our opinion as to whether the H.E.L.P. Program, as currently constituted, is insurance. The H.E.L.P. Program is a plan marketed as a contractual appendix to service agreements sold by fuel oil dealers to fuel oil customers. Two versions of the plan are marketed: one version provides for the clean up of the accidental release of oil on a customer's property caused by a leaking fuel oil tank: the other provides for the clean up and replacement of a defective tank.
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In your letter dated October 9, 2001 you requested an opinion of this office as to whether the State Marshal Commission has the authority to institute a policy and procedure for the service of restraining orders by state marshals.
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You have requested an opinion of the Attorney General regarding an inquiry from Wesleyan University Office of Public Safety.