Formal Opinions
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You have asked my opinion regarding the Judicial Review Council’s obligation to permit public access to records of investigations of complaints of judicial misconduct.
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You have each separately requested the opinion of the Attorney General concerning the eligibility of Connecticut state employees to receive retirement credit under Connecticut General Statutes §§ 5-192i(j) and 5-192j(d)1 for periods of full-time National Guard service in the armed forces of the United States. Such service may occur both while an individual is employed by the State of Connecticut, during periods of extended military leave, and, if the service occurred in time of war as defined by Connecticut General Statutes § 27-103, or qualifies as national emergency service, as defined by law, during periods of time which may have preceded an individual's state employment.
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Thank you for your letter of December 23, 2005, seeking my opinion concerning issues relating to your on-going efforts to procure voting machines that comply with the requirements of the federal Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”). Does Connecticut state law require that electronic voting machines utilize a “full face” ballot?
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I am writing in response to your request that I review the proposal for needy Connecticut citizens to receive heating oil assistance from Citizens Energy through its agreement with CITGO, a major oil refiner in the United States owned by a company controlled by the Venezuelan government.
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You ask whether the United States Marshals Service (“the Marshals Service”) may access the Judicial Branch’s Paperless Rearrest Warrant Notification (“PRAWN”) database, which contains records of all rearrest warrants issued by the Superior Court.
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The Honorable John G. Rowland, The Capitol, 2002-018 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
On October 9, 2002, the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission) ruled that the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA) was not required to disclose to the public eight documents in CRRA's possession which were the subject of an April 17, 2002, and an April 23, 2002 Freedom of Information Complaint filed by Paul A. Green and the Journal Inquirer. According to the Commission, the eight documents in question either constitute attorney-client communications or relate to CRRA's possible litigation strategy to recover the $220 million loaned to Enron and are, therefore, exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§1-210(b)(10) and 1-210(b)(4). By letter dated October 11, 2002, you have asked me to obtain from CRRA the eight documents that have not yet been disclosed and release them to the public.
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Your office has asked whether the recent injunction regarding Connecticut's Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA) issued by the United States District Court of Connecticut, and upheld by the Second Circuit, impedes in any way the implementation of Public Act 01-211, concerning victim notification. That Act requires victim notification of applications for exemption from the Sex Offender Registry or its notification requirements.
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This is in response to your letter dated June 2, 1998, in which you request our opinion regarding the scope of authority delegated to the State Traffic Commission ("Commission") to establish speed limits on multiple lane, limited access state highways. More specifically, you ask whether or not the Commission has the authority to establish a speed limit above fifty-five (55) miles per hour but less than the sixty-five (65) miles per hour maximum speed limit set forth in Conn. Public Acts No. 98-181, Sec. 1.
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In a letter dated April 16, 1998, you requested our advice on the authority of the New Haven County Sheriffs Department to operate the Union Avenue Detention Center (New Haven lockup). Your request arose as a result of a report by the Auditors of Public Accounts which questions whether your continued operation of the New Haven lockup is in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
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By memoranda dated October 20, 1989, you asked for a formal opinion on whether there are any statutes which prohibit towns from imposing "special exception" zoning permit requirements on family day care homes that are registered by the Department of Human Resources.
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This is in response to your letter of November 27, 1996, in which you requested the opinion of this office as to whether the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (hereinafter "CHRO") retains jurisdiction pursuant to Public Act 96-241 Section 1, to process discriminatory practice complaints filed on or before January 1, 1996 when CHRO has issued a finding of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause not later than January 1, 1997, and one of the following circumstances applies: The Complainant has requested reconsideration and the reconsideration request is pending action by the Commission on January 1, 1997. The Complainant has requested reconsideration, the Commission has reconsidered the complaint, and the Commission's investigator is conducting additional investigation pursuant to the Commission's reconsideration. The Complainant has appealed the Commission's determination (merit assessment review or no reasonable cause) to court, the appeal is pending on January 1, 1997 and the court subsequently remands the case to the Commission for further investigation. The Complainant has appealed the Commission's determination of no reasonable cause to court and the court already has remanded the case to the Commission. The Attorney General or Commission Counsel have withdrawn or withdraw after January 1, 1997, the certification of the complaint to public hearing for further investigation.
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In a memorandum dated October 5, 1998, your agency asked for our opinion regarding two questions that have arisen since the issuance of our September 28, 1998 opinion regarding Public Act 98-111. The first question asks the following: 1) A review of the opinion would seem to indicate that an individual convicted of, for example, C.G.S. Sec. 53a-71(a)(1), and sentenced to a term of probation commencing September 28, 1998 would not have to be registered under either Public Act 97-183 or Public Act. 98-111. Your second question is as follows: 2) Section 3(b) of the Act provides that any individual who has been subject to the registration requirements of Public Act 97-183 must register under Public Act 98-111 in the manner required for sexually violent offenders.
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You have requested our advice concerning the meaning of a provision within Conn. Gen. Stat. e 7-402, which relates to the deposit of public money and trust funds by municipalities and school districts.
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You have asked us whether l989 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 89-322, "An Act Concerning Liability of Corporate Directors" (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), applies to banking institutions and credit unions organized under Title 36 of the General Statutes, "The Banking Law of Connecticut."
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This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to whether Executive Order No. 7 (the "Order") establishing a State Contracting Standards Board (the "Board") is unconstitutional, in whole or in part, as a violation of the separation of powers clause of article second of the state Constitution.