The Office of Attorney General William Tong
Formal Opinions
Page 33 of 41
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In his letter to us, Lt. Col. John A. Mulligan requested our advice concerning the use of certain closed circuit video monitoring equipment to monitor the area to the rear of certain motor vehicles. His specific question to us is "whether installation and use of such equipment violates Section 14-105 of the General Statutes or any other provision of our law."
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In your June 26, 2001 letter you request our opinion as to whether P.A. 01-141, §4 authorizes the Board of Trustees for the Connecticut State University System (CSUS) to establish, subject to authorization by the Board of Governors of Higher Education, a pilot education doctoral program to be conducted at one of its institutions only or whether such a doctoral program may be conducted at more than one of its institutions.
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This is in response to your request for advice regarding treatment rendered by emergency medical personnel. As we understand it, there have been a number of instances recently where it has come to the attention of the Office of Emergency Medical Services within the Department of Health Services that emergency medical personnel1 have rendered treatment in circumstances not limited to their employment by a licensed ambulance company or as volunteers of a certified ambulance company.
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In a letter to us, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Mulligan requested our advice regarding the propriety of state police and local constables entering upon private property for the purpose of enforcing an ordinance of the town of Woodbury regarding the removal of junked cars from private property.
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In your letter of July 12, 1989, you requested our opinion regarding the meaning of certain provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. e 14-253a, which mandates that parking spaces be established and reserved for handicapped persons.
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In your letter of October 12, 1990, you posed several questions regarding the property tax relief program in Conn. Gen. Stat. e 12-62d. From discussions with your staff, we have been informed that the only question which we need answer concerns the proper interpretation of l989 Conn. Pub. Acts 89-251, e 192(h)(2), codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. e 12-62d(h)(2).
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You have requested our advice on whether the provisions of the Connecticut Fire Safety Code, the Connecticut State Building Code and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-315, with regards to automatic fire extinguishing systems, preempt the field so as to preclude local ordinances on the subject.
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By letter dated February 26, 1993 you have asked for our advice as to whether an increase in the amount of money appropriated to municipalities under the Education Cost Sharing (ECS) grant program (Conn. Gen. Stat. e10-262h) which has been recommended by the governor for SFY 1993-94 is properly counted as a "general budget expenditure" for the purposes of determining whether the authorized expenditure limitation imposed by Conn. Gen. Stat. e2-33a, commonly known as "the spending cap", will be exceeded.
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This is in response to your department's request for a formal opinion from this office as to whether or not Section 3-7 of the General Statutes is applicable to certain internal service/revolving funds administered by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS). Your department's request focuses on whether monies owed to the funds by other State agencies may be cancelled from the books of DAS or otherwise compromised in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-7.
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This is in response to your letter of July 22, 1991, in which you seek our opinion on whether the Department of Transportation ("DOT") has the authority to cancel the unexpended balance of purchase orders that the DOT has issued to Hartford Paving Inc. ("Hartford Paving") for bridge painting services under Contract Award No. 89--A-13-1054-C. You further ask whether the DOT can avoid contracting with Hartford Paving on future painting projects and instead use other companies listed in the contract award.
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We are writing in response to your letter of February 19, 1991 in which you request our advice concerning whether certain physicians and psychologists, who serve as "medical consultants" and "psychological/psychiatric consultants'' to the Division of Rehabilitation Services and who are hired pursuant to personal services agreements, are immune from personal liability pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 4-165.
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In your letter of June 16, 1994, you ask whether an employee of the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (CRRA) may, upon election to the General Assembly, continue to hold his employment with CRRA, or be prohibited from holding the CRRA position due to the "dual job ban" set forth in either Conn. Const. Art. III,
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In June 2000, the Office of Policy and Management retained Spaulding & Slye ("S&S") as a consultant to assist in the development and marketing of the Norwich State Hospital property. The 2000 contract also gave S&S the right to offer to purchase the property. The contract with Spaulding & Slye terminated in December 2003 and in March 2004 OPM issued a Request for Proposals ("RFP") for the purchase and development of the hospital property. In a letter dated March 3, 2004 you have asked whether Spaulding & Slye may submit a proposal in response to the RFP and what the state's legal exposure would be from other bidders if S&S is allowed to submit a proposal or from S&S if a bid from them is precluded. Subsequently on March 5, 2004, you also asked whether the state may place a restriction on the property prohibiting it from being annexed by an Indian Tribe.
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By letter dated March 28, 2000 you requested an opinion as to whether Substitute Senate Bill 311, "An Act Concerning The Observance of Martin Luther King Day," if enacted, would unconstitutionally impair a municipality's contracts with its employee collective bargaining units."
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John P. Burke, Department of Banking, 2000-006 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
You have asked for our opinion as to whether Section 36a-158(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes violates the Commerce Clause of the Unites States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as to an out-of-state state-chartered bank that wishes to establish an automated teller machine ("ATM") in this state.