Formal Opinions

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  • Formal Opinion 2014-002, Attorney General, State of Connecticut

    What is the proper treatment of applicants to the Judicial Selection Committee for consideration for Judicial nomination by candidates who have previously served as Superior Court judges, but resigned.

  • 2015-06 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut

    An opinion about the responsibilities of the Executive Administrator of the Office of Governmental Accountability (OGA) with regard to labor relations. In particular, you ask who - the Executive Administrator or the head of the individual agencies - has authority to respond to labor grievances.

  • 2015-04 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut

    An opinion regarding whether the State Teachers' Retirement Board ("STRB") has the statutory authority to rescind credit for a member in the teachers' retirement system ("System")

  • 2016-03 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut

    What is the impact legislation authorizing daily fantasy sports contests may have on the State's current revenue-sharing arrangements with the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation ("MPTN") and the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut (the "Mohegan Tribe," together with MPTN, the "Tribes"). Although there is a high degree of uncertainty, there is a substantial risk that the passage of such legislation could jeopardize the State's revenue-sharing arrangements with the Tribes.

  • 2017-09 Formal Opinion, Attorney General, State of Connecticut

    Formal opinion concerning two matters identified in the State of Connecticut Auditors' Report, Military Department, for the Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2012 and 2013 ("Auditors' Report"). First, you have asked whether the requirements under Connecticut General Statutes § 4-37e et seq. pertaining to foundations established for the principal purpose of supporting or improving state agencies or for coordinated emergency recovery purposes apply to the Connecticut National Guard Foundation, Inc. (CNGFI). Second, you have asked whether the authority of the Governor of the State of Connecticut pursuant to the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes §§ 27-9 and 27-10, as delegated to and administered by the Connecticut Miiitary Depmtment (CTMD), is restricted to ordering members of the Connecticut State Guard to active service under the "State Active Duty" (SAD) program only for "emergency situations" as suggested by the Auditors' Report.

  • Honorable Evonne Klein in regards to Department of Housing,Formal Opinion 2013-001, Attorney General State of Connecticut

    This letter responds to yours dated June 25, 2013, in which you request our opinion on whether the Department of Housing ("DOH") is public housing agency under the United States Housing Act of 1937 (the "Housing Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq.

  • Audrey Rowe, Department of Income Maintenance, 1992-031 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In your letter of June 5, 1992, you requested our opinion regarding the validity of certain legislation proposed by the Department Of Income Maintenance (DIM). That legislation would require any recipient, or any attorney representing such an individual, who initiates a legal action against a third party for recovery of medical expenses, to report the filing of that suit to the Department of Income Maintenance.

  • Carolyn Signorelli, Chief Child Protection Attorney, Formal Opinion 2007-015, Attorney General State of Connecticut

    This letter is in response to your request for a formal legal opinion as to whether attorneys who serve dually as attorneys and guardians ad litem (“GALs”) in certain Juvenile Matters are entitled to “state employee immunity and liability defense” by the Attorney General

  • Honorable John G. Rowland, Hartford, Connecticut 06106, 1995-014 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    On February 17, 1995, you requested an opinion of this office on whether or not seven individuals appointed by former Governor Weicker are qualified to serve as members of the Employees' Review Board, and the terms they can serve if they are qualified.

  • John P. Burke, Department of Banking, 1995-017 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Your department has sought our opinion on two questions relating to the interplay, if any, between Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 36a-380 and 42-202. The first question asks us: (1) Is a broker-dealer which is a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or registered under CUSA [Connecticut Uniform Securities Act] a "registered broker-dealer", "authorized by law to act as an escrow agent", within the meaning of Section 42-202 of the Connecticut General Statutes? The second question was posed as follows: (2) Does Section 36-314 apply to a corporation that is appointed to act as escrow agent with regard to the money or securities received from the sale of funeral services contracts? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative: (a) Must such corporation obtain a special act of the Connecticut General Assembly in order to act as an escrow agent under Section 42-202, or is such corporation, by virtue of Section 42-202 or otherwise, "specifically empowered so to act by a general statute of this state" within the meaning of Section 36-314; and (b) Does such corporation come within the jurisdiction of both the Department of Banking and the Department of Public Health and Addiction Services?

  • Honorable Robert M. Ward, Legislative Office Building, Rm 4200, 1995-007 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In a letter dated August 16, 1994, Representative Krawiecki, then House Minority Leader, requested that this office answer two questions regarding an alleged boundary dispute in the Borough of Newtown. We now reply to your attention. 1. His first question asked: What is the appropriate method for taxpayers who assert that the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state are unknown or inadequately marked to compel that entity to conduct a survey of its boundary? 2. His second question asked: Does an individual member of the General Assembly have the power to compel a political subdivision such as a borough to survey its boundary?

  • Honorable Louis S. Goldberg, Department of Administrative Services, 1995-022 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for our opinion on whether the provisions of Special Act 95-12 preclude you from entering into a contract with Corporate Express, a private corporation, for a statewide direct delivery service for office supplies.

  • Hon. Mortimer A. Gelston, Connecticut Siting Council, 1995-001 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have requested our opinion regarding the legal status of a tower to be used by WHUS, the radio station funded by student activity fees at the University of Connecticut at Storrs (the "University"). Specifically, you have asked whether the tower, on which the Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police (the "State Police") intends to place telecommunications equipment, is "owned or operated by the state" within the meaning of the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act ("PUESA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50i(a)(6).

  • Hon. John G. Rowland, Executive Chambers, 1995-008 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    We have received your letters of February 8, 1995, soliciting our opinion on issues concerning temporary gubernatorial appointments arising from the application of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-7(b)(2). Specifically, you both ask whether a "designate" under § 4-7(b)(2) must be sworn in pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-1 before exercising the powers and duties of the office.

  • Judge Aaron Ment, Supreme Court Building, 1996-011 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    Your office has posited several questions regarding the retroactive versus prospective application of Public Acts 96-63 and 96-79, which amend Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a, commonly referred to as the Connecticut Erasure Statute. The primary effects of the amendments are to remove the category of transcripts of criminal trials from the types of records that are subject to erasure, and to delay the actual physical destruction of erased records.