The Office of Attorney General William Tong
1994 Formal Opinions
Page 1 of 3
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James A. Gasecki, Sheriffs' Advisory Board, 1994-016 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut
In your letter of March 15, 1994, you indicate that in two lawsuits, Kennedy St. George v. Mak, Case No. 5:92-CV-00587(JAC), United States District Court, District of Connecticut, and Lewis v. Mak, Case No. 5:92-CV-00593(JAC), United States District Court, District of Connecticut, the Attorney General's Office has advised the High Sheriff of Fairfield County and several persons in his department that it would be inappropriate for the Attorney General's Office to continue to represent them in those cases. Consequently, on behalf of the Sheriffs' Advisory Board you have asked for legal advice on the following question: Does the Sheriff's Advisory Board have authority to appropriate funds for the defense of sheriffs, deputy sheriffs and special deputy sheriffs in lawsuits brought against them in their individual capacities after the Attorney General has determined that providing a defense would be inappropriate pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat.
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You have requested the opinion of this office as to whether "it would be possible for the Milford and Hartford Jai Alai to be the subject of wagering at off-track betting (OTB) facilities."
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At the close of the last Legislative session, you posed a number of questions about the Memorandum of Understanding executed by Governor Weicker and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe relating to the operation of video facsimile machines at the Foxwoods Casino on the Tribe's reservation in Ledyard.
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This letter is in response to your joint request dated August 11, 1993, for a formal opinion concerning interior design. In particular, you have asked three questions: 1. What effect does the requirement of Conn.Gen.Stat.
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We are in receipt of your letter of June 22, 1994 wherein you call our attention to P.A. 93-219, Sec. 10. In your letter you seek our advice as to what extent, if any, the provisions of this section affect the computation of discharge dates for sentences subject to this statute. Section 10 of this Act provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, any person convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1994, shall be subject to supervision by personnel of the department of correction or the board of parole until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced.
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This is in response to your letter dated January 31, 1994, in which you request a formal opinion of the Attorney General concerning an issue relating to the jurisdiction of the tax review committee (hereinafter "the committee") under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-3a. Please advise me whether the tax review committee has statutory authority to consider and to waive any penalty in excess of one hundred dollars that the Commissioner of Revenue Services has determined not to waive.
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In a letter dated July 21, 1994 you wrote to the Attorney General seeking an opinion concerning the status of the Mobil Oil Corporation pursuant to a cost reimbursement request to the Underground Storage Tank Petroleum Clean-up Fund Review Board ("Review Board").
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By letter dated August 17, 1993, you have asked our office as to the appropriateness of compensating a public member of the Commission on Hospitals and Health Care, Gwen B. Weltman, for the period September 4, 1992 to June 3, 1993.
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We are in receipt of your August 16, 1994 letter, wherein you seek our advice "[i]n anticipation of a possible freedom of information request." The anticipated request, we learned, may seek, inter alia, the addresses of state employees that you have in computer files maintained for state payroll purposes.
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Prior to the merger of the Department of Health Services and the former Connecticut Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission (CADAC), the Executive Director of CADAC, Dr. John Higgins-Biddle, requested a formal opinion from this Office regarding the impact of the federal regulations concerning confidentiality of alcohol and drug abuse patient records, 42 C.F.R. Part 2, or any other pertinent state or federal law or regulation related to patient confidentiality, on a new data system that CADAC was having designed by Andersen Consulting, Inc. After the merger of CADAC into the Department of Public Health and Addiction Services (DPHAS),1 you informed us that your Department is continuing with the development of the proposed data system, that the merger has not affected either the scope or nature of Dr. Higgins-Biddle's previous opinion request, and that you still need advice regarding the questions that he originally posed
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We have received an inquiry from each of you relating to persons currently serving as justice of the peace. We first answer the Secretary's question and then that raised by the Speaker. 1. In a May 24, 1994, letter from Secretary Kezer, the Secretary inquires as to the validity of legislation providing for the extension of terms of current justices of the peace in light of Judge Dorsey's ruling in ACP v. Kezer, 2:92CV00550 (PCD) prohibiting holdover-terms after June 30, 1994. We answer that the legislation extending these terms is valid. 2. In an August 1, 1994, letter from Speaker Ritter, the Speaker asks whether "it is proper to fill vacancies which now exist" in the office of justice of the peace.
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You have requested our advice on several questions relating to the liability of the Second Injury Fund for payment of workers' compensation claims when an insurer of such claims has been determined to be insolvent. The Second Injury Fund ("the Fund") and the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association have asserted differing interpretations of the statutes governing such liability.
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This is in response to your letter dated December 1, 1993, in which you request our opinion on whether the Department of Transportation's use of on-call consultants is contrary to the requirements of Sections 13b-20b through 13b-20l of the Connecticut General Statutes. http://www.cslib.org/attygenl/images/rainbow.gif
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In your letter of May 20, 1994, you inquired whether the State of Connecticut should continue to require car rental companies to be licensed as sellers of gasoline. You explained that some car rental agencies require their customers to return the vehicles with a particular amount of gasoline. If the vehicles are not returned with the requisite amount of gasoline, the agencies will provide gasoline from their own pumps and will charge the customers for the gasoline.
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We are writing in response to your request for a legal opinion regarding the "accessibility" of income and assets of the Hutterian Brethren in Connecticut, Inc., a Connecticut nonstock corporation, to its individual members. You report that many Hutterians (including families, the elderly, pregnant woman, and young children) are currently receiving medical assistance benefits under the state's Title XIX Medicaid Program from the Department of Social Services (DSS). Specifically you ask: 1. What amount of income of the Brethren is available to its individual members? 2. What amount of assets of the Brethren is available to its individual members? 3. What legal obligation does the Brethren have to financially support its members? 4. What legal obligation does the Brethren have to meet the medical needs of its individual members?